Security reviews for production AI agents

We trace what your agents can read, change, and send. Then we work with your engineers to put permission checks around the tool calls that carry the most risk.

Authority Boundary Model Enforced Outside Model
PROBABILISTIC ZONE DETERMINISTIC ZONE POLICY GATE UNTRUSTED INPUTS Emails · Issues · RAG · Memory LLM Agent Planner Proposes (tool, target, args) INVARIANT Retrieved text stays data. It never grants privileges. SCOPED IDENTITY Short-lived, resource-bound CONSTRAINED EXECUTOR Exact approvals · Egress limits AUDIT & DETECTION Correlated provenance logs Fail-closed · Instant kill switch

The model proposes an action; trusted application code independently checks identity, target scope, provenance, and data flow before anything runs.

Our team

Eutaxia Tech Consultants is a technology consultancy focused on AI security. Our team brings experience in AI security at a leading chip manufacturer, alongside backgrounds in big tech and fintech.

Why "better prompts" do not secure production agents

Once an agent can read untrusted text and call privileged APIs, a text-generation error becomes an unauthorized action. We call this authority laundering.

Untrusted data steers privileged tools

Hidden instructions in emails, support tickets, web pages, or RAG chunks redirect tool selection. Real injections resemble social engineering, not obvious keyword strings.

Broad tokens bridge trust domains

A single shared token or over-scoped MCP server lets an agent read a private repo or confidential record and publish it out through a public tool in one chain.

No deterministic release gate

Jailbreak benchmarks do not verify IAM scopes, approval integrity, memory isolation, or fail-closed behavior when a policy service times out.

How we review agent permissions

Framework-agnostic controls that work with LangGraph, custom orchestrators, provider SDKs, and MCP clients—using IAM, gateways, sandboxes, and CI pipelines you already run.

01

Never turn retrieved content into authority

Tag external inputs, tool outputs, and memory with source provenance and sensitivity labels. External text can inform a response; it can never grant permissions.

02

Separate proposal from execution

Validate and canonicalize every proposed tool call in trusted code independent of the model. Bind human approvals to the exact target and parameters.

03

Scope identity to the task

Replace shared developer PATs and broad service accounts with distinct agent identities, short-lived audience-bound tokens, and strict resource bounds.

04

Control data paths, not just individual tools

Enforce classification-aware egress rules, domain allowlists, and tenant isolation so sensitive data pulled from one tool cannot exit through another.

05

Test agent behavior like software

Pair deterministic policy tests with adversarial CI evaluations for injection, schema drift, approval substitution, and fail-closed outages.

Is your agent's authority actually constrained?

Check the controls you can verify with tests or configuration evidence today for your highest-impact agent.

When Prompts Become Privileges

Securing Agentic AI Workflows Beyond Prompt Injection (November 2026)

  • The Authority Boundary Model & 7 enforceable control boundaries
  • Framework-agnostic execution contract (JSON envelope + Python policy gate)
  • 12-scenario pre-production adversarial test suite & metrics
  • Full 40-point Readiness Checklist & 90-day engineering rollout plan
  • Crosswalk to OWASP Agentic Top 10, MITRE ATT&CK T1698/DET0942, NIST & MCP

Readiness checklist

Score 20 controls and record the evidence for each in a spreadsheet.